Talk given at the EEN-meeting, Lund.

Abstract. Harman’s view that logic isn’t specially relevant for reasoning (Harman [1986]) is best viewed as a multi-faceted objection to the received view that the laws of logic are (or provide) general as well as infallible rules for reasoning, rather than as a focused attack on this view.

By focusing on so-called rational failures of deductive cogency, and individuating four different attitudes towards them, I show how we can resist Harman's conclusion. On one account, a failure of deductive cogency is rational whenever Γ entails φ, but believing φ conditional on Γ is itself irrational. Namely, φ cannot be accepted while (a) any revision of Γ that does not entail φ is arbitrary and therefore irrational as well (cfr. the paradox of the preface), (b) there is no immediate way to revise Γ , or (c) revising Γ is too costly. The four different attitudes are simple revisionism, sophisticated revisionism, basic scepticism, and critical scepticism.

The following theses are defended:

1. The simple revisionist and the basic sceptic make the same mistake. They assume that because the rules of (classical) logic have no exceptions, norms based on this logic should also be exceptionless.

2. Taking the role of logic in reasoning seriously commits us either to sophisticated revisionism or to critical scepticism.

3. The sophisticated revisionist and the critical sceptic do not need to disagree about the appropriate formalism to model norms for reasoning. They only disagree on how the formalism should be understood.