Constructionism in Logic

Talk to be given at ICPI 2015 (IS4IS-Summit)

Abstract My goal in this talk is to further develop the informational conception of logic proposed in [1] by motivating and exploring a methodology for logical practices (using, developing and thinking about logic) that is inspired by the methodology from the philosophy of information, with particular emphasis on its constructionist metaphilosophy [2]. Against this background, I’m interested in the following phenomenon: If a formalisation-process leads to the refinement of one or more concepts we are interested in (either because we are explicitly formalising them, or because we use them to talk about the concepts we are actually formalising), this often leads to a “splitting of notions”. In that case, the uncareful use of the original notions in combination with their refinements often leads to fallacies of equivocation. As suggested in [3], the development of a design-perspective on logic is meant to show that this phenomenon is a reason to abandon the original concepts, and not a reason to cast doubt on the proposed refinement. As a corollary, constructionism is logic contributes to the motivation of a pluralist perspective on logical practices.

References

[1] P. Allo and E. Mares, "Informational Semantics as a Third Alternative?", Erkenntnis, 77, no. 2, p. . 167-185, 2012.

[2] L. Floridi, "A defence of constructionism: philosophy as conceptual engineering", Metaphilosophy, 42, no. 3, p. . 282-304, 2011.

[3] P. Allo, "Synonymy and intra-theoretical pluralism", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93, no. 1, p. . 77-91, 2015.