Talk given at a symposium on the meaning of logical connectives (organised by Luis Estrada-González) at CLMPS in Helsinki.

Abstract The goal of this contribution is to take a few steps back, and put in perspective our reasons for trying to avoid meaning-variance as a means to, first, save the possibility of genuine rivalry between different logics, and, second, safeguard the very idea of logical revision. One reason for this re-examination is that if we understand better why meaning-*in*variance across logics matters, we will also have a better idea of which kind of answer is satisfactory. Indeed, the hope could be that we can also delineate which types of counter-objections can summarily be dismissed once a good answer to the Quinean challenge has been given.

As part of the proposed inquiry, three complementary perspectives will be adopted. First, we will reconsider the stances of Carnap and Kreisel with respect to formal and informal rigour; second, we will take some lessons from the distinction between data and phenomena (as used in the context of conceptual modelling by Löwe and Müller); finally, we shall revisit the problem of meaning (in-)variance in informational conceptions of logic, and particularly in view of the inverse relationship between logical discrimination and deductive strength.